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The 1990s have been termed “the reform decade” in Brazil,
because of the significant number of changes which took
place in various aspects of that country’s economic and
administrative policy. This article aims to systematically set
forth the main features of those changes and analyse them
in the light of the literature on reforms. It represents an
attempt to sum up various studies made on the case of Brazil
as part of a regional-level study coordinated by ECLAC. The
article finds that in various aspects the results have been in
line with those proposed by the literature in question, but
not everything has turned out as planned or desired. It
considers that this disparity of results can be explained by
factors ranging from the way the reform process was
designed, in some cases, to the different perceptions by the
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I
Introduction
Analysis of the Brazilian economy during the 1990s
represents much more than something which coincides
with the calendar. This period, which is an extremely
fertile area of study, displays a number of aspects which
will continue to be analysed for a long time to come.
The international scene at the beginning of the
decade was marked by an increasingly intensive flow
of capital and technological changes, although the
difficulties associated with an unstable domestic
macroeconomic environment did not allow the Brazilian
economy to participate to the full in these new
movements. Furthermore, the economic policy-makers
were constantly being reminded of the success of the
emerging economies in other regions, and the path for
attaining such success seemed to be clearly marked,
according to the various analysts.
At the domestic level, the growing inflation was
giving rise to various anti-inflationary attempts, while
a new Constitution (promulgated in 1988) added further
fiscal and social problems to an already unsettled
economic environment.
In the second half of the decade, the context was
markedly different. The stabilization of prices achieved,
accompanied by relative openness to foreign trade, has
no precedent in the economic history of the country.
At the macroeconomic level, various important changes
were made which facilitated access to international
capital markets and led to a new growth pattern.
The purpose of the present article is to analyse these
features in the light of the adjustment process which
took place in the 1990s. Some aspects evolved in line
with the prescriptions of the specialized literature on
reforms in developing countries. Not everything turned
out as planned or desired, however. We consider that
the reasons for this lie in factors ranging from policy
design to the economic agents’ perceptions of the
market signals.1
This article has five sections. The following section
(section II) gives a brief overview of the literature on
the reforms, and more specifically the suggestions as
to the time and sequence for their application. Section
III then gives a detailed account of the basic
characteristics of the reforms applied in Brazil during
the 1990s. Section IV analyses some results which do
not fully correspond with the expectations, and an
attempt is made to identify the reasons for this. Finally,
section V relates some lessons that may be derived from
the recent Brazilian experience.
II
The need for reform,
and the basic recipes
In general, Latin American policy-makers were exposed
to a variety of pressures during the 1970s and 1980s.
The economic and social distortions and shortcomings
which existed, together with external constraints made
worse by the intensive movements in international com-
modity markets and the prevailing financial difficul-
ties, further increased the need to promote substantial
reforms.
The countries of the region adopted different
approaches in the course of the period studied,2
The views expressed here are exclusively those of the author
and do not necessarily correspond with those of ECLAC or the Uni-
versity of Brasilia. This text is an updated and edited version of
the chapter published in Baumann (coord.), 2000.
1 This article is based on the 1988-1998 period. Even so, we con-
sider that its findings hold good for the rest of the decade, because
although the economic contraction and changes in relative prices
in 1999 and the recovery in activity in the year 2000 changed some
aspects, most of the basic tendencies analysed here continue to
hold good.
2 As may be seen, for example, from the processes of greater openness
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although in general the design of the reforms was highly
influenced by the orthodox reading of the results of
the successful experiences of the emerging economies
of Southeast Asia. According to this view, reform was
an urgent task, because the sooner the adjustment
process was begun, the lower the costs involved would
be. In the words of a high World Bank official, “a delayed
adjustment is more painful” (Stern, 1991, p. 3).
Market-oriented policy reforms were recommended,
on the basis of four main arguments (Rodrik, 1993a, p. 7):
a) economic liberalization reduces the static inefficiencies
generated by faulty distribution and waste of resources;
b) it stimulates the learning process; c) outward-oriented
economies manage to cope with adverse external shocks
better, and d) market-based economic systems are less prone
to rent-seeking activities which lead to waste of resources.
Thus, a reform programme should include fiscal
discipline and measures to guarantee free trade, as well
as reducing existing market price distortions to the
minimum. Economies in the process of restructuring
should receive financial assistance during the transitional
period, as a way of reducing the costs associated with
the reforms at the microeconomic level: the adjustment
includes reforms of both policies and institutions, because
it is believed that such changes can improve resource
allocation, increase economic efficiency, expand the
growth potential and heighten resistance to future shocks
(Thomas, Chibber and De Melo, eds., 1991, p. 12).
The finance agencies and various academics agreed
that the measures which it was indispensable to take at
the start of the process3  included those now known as
the Washington Consensus: fiscal discipline;
reorientation of public expenditure priorities towards
the areas of health, education and infrastructure; fiscal
reform (broadening of the tax base and reduction of
marginal tax rates); establishment of competitive
exchange rates; guarantees for property; deregulation;
trade liberalization; privatization; elimination of barriers
to foreign investment, and financial liberalization.
This ideal roadmap for a system free of distortions
sheds little light on how to cope with some crucial
aspects, however (Conley and Maloney, 1995), such
as: how to minimize the costs of the adjustment; how
to cope with the implications of different rates of
adjustment between sectors; the right macro-policy to
apply during the reforms (specifically, how to manage
the exchange rate), and how to minimize the
consequences for social welfare of leaving one sector
controlled while others are freed of State intervention.
In an ideal world, anyone who had to reform –for
example– trade policies would not need to bother with
these intermediate stages, as the optimum policy would
be an immediate leap to free trade, unless there were
specific market distortions (Mussa, 1986).
In practice, however, proper design of the reform
process is essential, and not only for the benefit of
academic appraisals or in order to ensure political
support for the reforms. Credibility is an essential aspect
which must be taken into account (Calvo, 1989). Lack
of confidence in the durability of a reform brings in
distortions which can end up by destroying it: the reform
process can be reversed simply because people believe
it is only going to have a short life.4
The need to recommend a particular path to follow
in the reform process has given rise to a literature
focussing on the proper moment and sequence of the
reforms which also emphasizes the importance of
eliminating all uncertainty about the government’s
intentions.
The major part of the debate has been on whether
trade liberalization should precede or follow
liberalization of the capital account.5  Experience has
shown that a macroeconomic imbalance at the
beginning of a period of reforms can affect the final
results. There is therefore an additional and more
specific debate on the sequence that should be followed
in an initial economic environment of high inflation,
with special attention to synchronization between the
price stabilization process and the reforms proper.6
Another aspect connected with the analysis of the
reforms7  is the relation between reform of the domestic
in Argentina, Chile and Uruguay in the late 1970s and early 1980s, as
compared with the later trade reforms in Bolivia, Brazil and Mexico.
3 According to Williamson (1990).
4 A simple example is that of a trade reform which is only perceived
as being temporary. The economic agents may perceive that
imported goods will only temporarily be cheaper: in those
circumstances, they will assume bigger debts than they normally
would, simply by bringing forward their consumption. If they can
obtain finance (in the belief that they will have higher permanent
incomes) through an open capital account, present consumption
will increase (Conley and Maloney, 1995). The current account
imbalance resulting from such actions can lead to the restoration
of trade barriers and consequent reversal of the original trend.
5 The literature does not express any clear conclusions on the point
in time at which the reforms should also include other markets,
such as the labour market (an inevitable step if trade openness
continues).
6 This was a matter of great interest for Brazil in the early 1990s.
7 Strongly influenced by the Chilean experience in the early 1980s.
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financial sector and liberalization of the balance of
payments capital account. Especially in countries with
high rates of inflation, the fiscal deficit and interventions
in the financial market often result in artificially low
domestic interest rates. When opening of the capital
account takes place in a context in which domestic
interest rates are being kept below their equilibrium
level, the result will be the draining-away of resources.
If the fiscal deficit is under control, however, the
reformed domestic financial market will operate at
equilibrium interest rates.
There would thus appear to be little to discuss
regarding the sequence between reform of the domestic
financial market and liberalization of capital
movements: the barriers to international capital
movements should not be eased before the domestic
financial sector is liberalized.8
A number of authors have also argued that
liberalization of the capital account should only take
place after trade and other distortions have been
eliminated (McKinnon, 1982). By giving rise to inflows
of capital, the easing of controls on capital leads to an
increase in the level of aggregate expenditure, both on
tradeables and on non-tradeables, which will in turn
promote a real revaluation of the currency, hindering
or even frustrating foreign trade liberalization.9
Although the opening of the capital account usually
leads to a real revaluation of the currency, it is known
both theoretically and empirically (Choksi and
Papageorgiou, eds., 1986),10  in respect of a number of
cases of trade policy reform, that successful trade
liberalization generally requires real devaluation of the
currency.
Thus, in principle trade reform should be adopted
before eliminating controls on foreign capital flows.
This conclusion gives rise to two other dilemmas,
however.
Firstly, it is not clear from this debate whether a
gradual reform is preferable to one that takes place more
abruptly. As Edwards (1990) explains, a gradual
approach can have characteristics which either increase
or compromise the credibility of the reforms, depending
on the real conditions in each country: if it reduces
unemployment or makes possible fiscal balance, a
gradual reform will tend to generate greater credibility,
but at the same time, a slower reform process could
allow the groups affected by the new policies to
organize themselves in order to act against them.
Another aspect is the relation between the reforms
and price stability. Economic theory offers few
guidelines in this area. Even so, experience suggests
(Corbo and Fischer, 1992) that in economies with acute
macroeconomic problems reforms should only be
begun after suitable reduction of the imbalances in
question: instability limits the benefits of reforms aimed
at improving resource allocation through changes in
relative prices.
With regard to trade liberalization –the first stage
in the proposed reform scheme– there are three
arguments in favour of delaying it until inflation is under
control (Rodrik, 1993b). First, the already mentioned
variability of relative prices, which affects the way the
advantages of the greater efficiency are passed on.
Second, trade liberalization could affect fiscal income
if the reduction or elimination of duties on trade exceeds
the fiscal income deriving from the increase in trade
activity. Third, liberalization requires a compensatory
devaluation of the exchange rate in order to protect the
current account, and this would affect domestic price
stabilization, through the cheaper imports favoured by
a revalued currency.
The exchange rate argument calls for some
detailed considerations. From the theoretical point of
view, this is the aspect which imposes the most serious
restrictions on trade liberalization.11  As far as this
article is concerned, this matter is directly related with
proper understanding of the Brazilian experience since
1994.
The debate on the application of reforms in a
context of stabilization policies has been concentrated
on whether the reforms can effectively facilitate the
process of reducing inflation, since trade liberalization
should make possible price stabilization by forcing
convergence between the rates of variation of the
domestic and external prices of tradeable goods.
Whereas trade liberalization requires compensatory
exchange rate devaluation (because of wage rigidities),
however, price stabilization requires, on the contrary,
avoidance of such devaluation, so that the exchange
8 Edwards and Edwards (1987) and Edwards (1990). As we shall
see below, the question of regulation of the liberalized financial
sector is also of fundamental importance.
9 Another way of presenting this argument is based on the rate of
adjustment of the goods and financial markets: since the former is
slower to adjust than the latter, a homogeneous reform will require
the liberalization of the goods markets before the financial mar-
kets.
10
 It is considered that real devaluation of the currency is a neces-
sary condition for successful trade liberalization. 11 See the analysis in Rodrik (1993b).
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rate can be used either as a means of attaining a real
goal (in which case it forms part of the process of fixing
prices and wages) or as a nominal anchor for domestic
price levels (in which case it leads this process).
Furthermore, when accompanied by financial
liberalization,12  real exchange rate revaluation
tends to  compromise the credibi l i ty  of  the
liberalization process, or else, once the initial excess
of capital inflows is over, the expectations of real
devaluation may lead to higher real interest rates,
precisely at a time when the productive sector is
going through the difficult period of adjustment
following the easing of trade restrictions (Edwards and
Edwards, 1987).
However, this dilemma over the exchange rate may
be illusory, if over-valuation of the exchange rate is
viewed as the price that must be paid for ensuring the
credibility of the process. If, on the one hand, inflation
has a strong inertial component linked to indexing or
the accommodation of key nominal variables13  to
delayed variations in price levels, then on the other
hand, in order to be credible a policy must not only
fight inflation but must also eliminate the nominal
rigidities which make it necessary to use devaluation
to ensure competitiveness.
From this point of view, exchange rate overvaluation
may be considered as an appropriate approach, although
not devoid of risks. For a public which has already
witnessed the failure of many anti-inflation plans due to
the lack of political will, an ambitious package which
attacks all the sources of inflation may be taken to
indicate the presence of a government with clear
decisions and well-defined policies, so that a reversal of
policy in the event of temporary problems will be less
likely. Thus (Rodrik, 1993b), the use of the exchange
rate as a nominal anchor may not necessarily conflict
with trade liberalization, since if that anchor works,
nominal wage rigidity will finally disappear and
sustainable competitiveness will be more likely.
The last two observations regarding the reforms
are connected with the fact that: a) open market policies
generate their own group of interested parties (Rodrik,
1992) –as new opportunities for gain appear, the
business community benefitted by the post-inflation
situation will tend to fight against any attempt to reverse
that state of affairs; and b) a reformed system does not
necessarily mean the elimination of rent-seeking
activities –as long as governments are responsible for
applying policies, individuals will always try to obtain
benefits for themselves (Rodrik, 1993a).
III
The reforms and the economy in
the 1990s
The 1990s are considered as the “reform decade” in
Brazil. Although some initial actions were taken in the
late 1980s –such as foreign trade liberalization and the
first privatization operations, for example– the most
significant stages only began to be fulfilled from 1990
on.
This decade represented a turning-point in the
country’s economic history. After having been for the
previous four decades a closed economy with a strong
presence of the State as a producer of goods and
services, and after a long period of high inflation with
indexing, at the end of the 1990s Brazil became an
economy with a marked degree of openness to
merchandise trade and capital14  and a simultaneous
reduction in the function of the State as a direct
producer.
In addition, the economy attained an
unprecedented degree of price stability which has
already lasted for over six years: the consumer price
index rose to a record level of 2,489% in 1993 but
12 The elimination of inflation-related gains as a result of a suc-
cessful stabilization process could lead the financial sector to seek
other sources of finance.
13 Wages, the monetary aggregates and the exchange rate.
14 According to estimates by Mesquita (1999), the imported com-
ponent of industrial production rose from 4.3% in 1989 to 20.3%
in 1998.
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gradually went down to single-digit values by 1996,
standing at 5.3% in the year 2000.15
In order to understand the reforms and their effects,
it is necessary to take into account the extremely
significant impact of a price stabilization process like
that which took place in this period: a) it generated a
“wealth effect” which affected both consumers and
producers; b) the stable macroeconomic situation
created a political environment favourable to the
reforms; c) it inspired confidence among Brazilian and
foreign investors, and d) at the same time it eliminated
the substantial gains obtained by the government and
the banking sector from inflation, with important
consequences for monetary and fiscal policy as well as
for the design of the new regulations for the financial
sector as a whole.
The specialized literature on policy reforms usually
takes a taxonomic approach in which various levels of
measures are identified. According to this view, Brazil
has almost completed its first-generation reforms, which
began with trade openness and the privatization of State
enterprises in the late 1980s and has been further
intensified since the early 1990s. The country has also
taken a number of steps towards second-generation
reforms such as those in social security, public
administration and fiscal policy.
There were also other policy changes in the same
period which had important consequences for the
economy. Social programmes were thoroughly
redesigned in order to incorporate the new universal
rights guaranteed by the 1988 Constitution and to
overcome fiscal difficulties and spread the burden of
providing services among the federal government, the
states and the municipalities.
On the social level, as well as in other areas such
as science and technology, there was growing (although
still insufficient) private sector participation in the
financing of various activities. The recent fiscal results
and the forecasts for coming years suggest that this is a
feature which could be further accentuated in the future.
This does not mean that the reforms have
necessarily been in the right direction, that they have
been properly applied, and much less that they are now
complete. There can be no doubt, however, that they
have substantially changed the production environment
in recent years.
It might be wondered why such a concentration of
reforms took place in this particular period of time. The
answer has to do with the increasing perception of the
domestic economic actors –government authorities,
employers and analysts from the academic field– that
changes were very necessary. The conjuncture of the
final stages of the multilateral trade negotiations, the
renewed access of other Latin American countries to
finance, and the fiscal policies applied in other
economies16  acted as a stimulus for the reformers.
The reforms –especially privatization and the
redesign of social security– called for major changes
in the Constitution. Political will and power were
therefore needed, and these could only be attained on
the basis of consensus among the economic agents.
Figure 1 shows the sequence in which the main
reforms took place. The process began with the reform
of trade policy and, early in the 1990s, some sporadic
tentative moves towards the privatization of public
assets, followed by the opening of the balance of
payments capital account. The second generation of
reforms only began in the second half of the decade,
with reforms in public administration and social
security, accompanied by a series of changes in various
social programmes covering education, health and the
reduction of poverty.
1. Trade reform
Trade reform began in 1987, with the first change in
the nominal tariff structure in 30 years and a progres-
sive reduction in tariff rates which gained pace from






There were two points at which the tariff reduction
process speeded up: in 1990, and again in late 1994. In
both cases one of the main arguments for carrying out
the process was the need to provoke a competitiveness
shock among Brazilian producers, breaking up
15 As we shall see below, in spite of the marked exchange rate de-
valuation in 1999, the consumer price index only rose by 8.4% in
that year.
16 The tax and interest rate differentials were an important stimu-
lus for arbitrage-related international financial movements.
17 A full examination of the changes in trade policy in the 1990s
should also take into account the fact that, for the first time in its
history, Brazil formed part of a regional integration process, which
brought in some important additional considerations.
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monopoly situations and using trade policy as a
complement to the price stabilization process.18  The
1990 trade reform was broadened to include the
elimination of non-tariff barriers and various export
incentives, as well as a significant reform of the
institutional structure responsible for foreign trade
policy. The 1994 reform led to partial advance
application19  of the MERCOSUR common external tariff,
which would otherwise only have come into effect in
January 1995.
Consequently, analysis of the impact of trade
reforms on the balance of payments is not direct,
because: a) due to the special features of the very large
domestic market which had been closed for so many
years, some time passed before imports reached a
significant level; b) the growth of exports was the result
of two simultaneous processes: multilateral tariff
reduction and the regional preferences in force in
MERCOSUR; c) the price stabilization after 1994 caused
a “wealth effect” which affected domestic demand for
imported goods, and d) exchange rate policy kept the
currency markedly overvalued up to 1999, and this
affected foreign trade.
Taking account of these preliminary observations,
it may simply be noted that the trade surpluses which
averaged US$ 13 billion between 1992 and 1994 turned
into trade deficits of US$ 6 billion in the 1995-1998
period.20  The import coefficient21  rose from 5.5% in
1990-1993 to 7.2% in 1995-1997 (see figure 2). The
imported goods in greatest demand were raw materials
and intermediate products, capital goods and motor
vehicles. The importance of this import structure for
the domestic investment cycle and some production
sectors will be analysed later on in this article.
The trade reforms were substantial and really
served to: i) increase the imported component in
domestic production,22  which ii) raised the
productivity of labour23  and iii) increased the
consumer surplus (total imports of consumer goods
FIGURE 1
Brazil: A decade of reformsa
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
or earlier
Trade reform * * * * * * * * * * *
Opening up to external * * * *
financial capital
Privatization * * * * * * *
Regulation of financial
sector * * * * * *
Reform of social security * * * * *
Administrative reform * *
Reform of social
programmes:
Education * * * * * *
Health * * * * * *
Source: Prepared by the author.
a
 The asterisks indicate the approximate date of the main measures designed to regulate each of the reform processes rather than the date of
the greatest intensity of change. It is important to bear this in mind, for example, in the case of the privatization process, which was much
more intense in 1998, in terms of the real value of the transactions carried out, than in any previous period.
18 There is still some criticism of the way these changes were car-
ried out. For a detailed description of the 1994-1996 tariff reforms,
see Baumann, Rivero and Zavattiero (1997).
19 In September 1994.
20 In spite of the sustained expansion of exports, which registered
an average annual growth rate of 6% between 1994 and 1998, and
the improvement of almost 20% in the terms of trade between 1991
and 1995.
21 Total imports/GDP (percentage).
22 Data from the IBGE show that in 1990 only 11% of gross fixed
capital formation in machinery and equipment corresponded to
imported goods, but by 1997 this percentage had risen to 41% (Saínz
and Calcagno, 1999).
23 Bonelli (1998) estimates that labour productivity in the manu-
facturing sector rose at the rate of 8.7% between 1991 and 1997,
compared with an average rate of 0.3% between 1981 and 1989
and a rate of 5.6% in the early 1970s.
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increased from US$ 2.6 billion in 1990 to US$ 11
billion in 1998), but their impact on exports was offset
by overvaluation of the exchange rate24  and the increase
in wages25  (especially in industry).
2. Opening-up to financial capital
There was also concern in the early 1990s to establish
conditions which would enable the Brazilian economy
to take advantage of the growing facilities for access to
international capital markets which existed at that time.
Ever since the 1950s, Brazil has stood out among
the developing countries because of the large share of
foreign capital in its production structure.26  Up to the
end of the 1970s, it was one of the countries which
received most foreign investment. The situation
changed during the crisis of the 1980s, and quite a
widespread perception grew up that the economy was
missing out on the opportunities created by financial
globalization, which were more plentiful in that decade
than in any other period.27
This led to the adoption, beginning in 1991, of
various specific policy measures aimed at creating
favourable conditions for attracting portfolio
investments. As a result, flows of such investments,
which amounted to less than US$ 800 million up to
1992, already rose to nearly US$ 7 billion in 1993. The
systematic deficits registered on the balance of
payments capital account between 1985 and 199128
turned into a surplus of US$ 25 billion in 1992.
It may be noted that this was a period of somewhat
limited economic activity: the GDP growth rates in 1991
and 1992 were 1% and -0.3%, respectively, rising to
4.5% in 1993. The inflow of resources was therefore
mainly due to the changes made in domestic
legislation29  and the relatively low levels of the equity
capital of Brazilian companies after several years of
inflation and low growth rates.
The recovery of domestic economic activity,30
together with the opportunities created by the
privatization process, subsequently caused foreign
direct investment to exceed the flows of portfolio
investments, FDI flows (in billions of dollars) being
approximately 0.9 in the 1990-1993 period, 2.2 in 1994
and 3.3 in 1995, but then rising to unprecedented levels
of 9.6 in 1996, 17 in 1997, 26 in 1998, and 30 in 1999.
3. Privatization
The new favourable conditions offered to foreign
investors, together with a favourable international
environment, gave rise to the first expectations of major
foreign participation in the privatization of State
enterprises. In reality, this was one of the main obstacles
encountered by the programme in its initial stages,
although the actual results would have shown that such
fears were exaggerated, since the share of foreign
investors in the national privatization programme31
represented less than 1% of total income.
FIGURE 2











Source:  Central Bank of Brazil.
24 Exchange policy during the 1990s was quite varied. Starting with
a situation where the market was allowed to determine the
equilibrium exchange rate (as a new means for breaking a long-
standing and generalized indexing process), the government found
it necessary to adopt a system of currency bands, which underwent
some modifications in the course of time. In January 1999, external
pressures which had built up as a result of the accumulated
overvaluation led to a new free-floating system.
25 A bilateral dollar-real index, deflated by the wholesale price
indexes prevailing in mid-1994, would show that the real was
overvalued from July 1994 to March 1996, with a peak of 17 points
in February 1995. Bonelli and Fonseca (1998a) give some details
in this respect: while the competitiveness of labour increased by
62% between 1990 and 1996, the average wage in dollars rose by
84%, so that the gains in terms of productivity were more than
offset by the increase in labour costs. In other words, the reduction
in competitiveness was not due solely or even mainly to
overvaluation of the exchange rate: wages in industry, deflated by
the wholesale price index, increased by 76% over the period,
compared with a 5% revaluation of the real vis-a-vis the dollar.
26 It is calculated (Chudnovsky and López, 1997) that, in 1995,
92% of total sales in the motor industry, 59% in the pharmaceutical
industry, 56% of sales of domestic appliances and 44% of the sales
of the beverages and tobacco industry in Brazil were linked with
foreign companies.
27 Brazil’s share in total world foreign direct investment was as
follows: 1970-1975, 5.1%; 1976-1980, 6.3%; 1981-1985, 4.4%;
1986-1990, 1.2%; 1991-1995, 1.3%, and 1996, 2.7%, according
to United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)
(various issues).
28 Due to amortization payments on the external debt.
29 And also to international liquidity.
30 After a rate of -0.3% in 1992, GDP growth averaged 4.5% in the
following four years.
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The privatization efforts began in the early 1980s,32
but it was only in the mid-1990s that the process really
got under way. In the period from 1991 to 2000, the
total income from the privatization programme
amounted to US$ 58 billion (in respect of enterprises
belonging to the federal government), plus US$ 33
billion in respect of enterprises owned by the federal
states. All this came to a total of US$ 74 billion for
sales of assets, plus US$ 18 billion in respect of debt
transfers (see table 1).
Between 1991 and 1994, only quite a small number
of enterprises were privatized, for a total income of US$
8.6 billion. It was in this phase that the privatization of
the industrial sector was completed, however, with the
sale of all the most important State enterprises: those
in the iron and steel, petrochemicals and fertilizers
sectors accounted for over 90% of the State’s industrial
activities. A curious aspect of this stage was that a third
of the total income corresponded to federal bonds.33
The total amount of resources involved –more than
US$ 92 billion over a period of 8 years–34  makes this
one of the biggest privatization processes in the world,
and it will certainly have a powerful impact on the
production sector. The process had a dual rationale: the
enterprises were sold in order to improve general
efficiency, but in a number of cases there were strong
fiscal motives.35
4. Fiscal accounts
The successful plan to combat inflation and privatize
State enterprises did not have the positive effects on
the fiscal accounts obtained in other countries, how-
ever. On the one hand, fiscal income was indexed be-
fore the stabilization process.36  Moreover, some items
of expenditure increased after stabilization, such as
public sector wages37  and expenditure on social secu-
rity, reform of the health sector, and adjustment of the
financial sector.
As a result, there was a deterioration in the fiscal
results from a surplus of 1.4% of GDP in 1994 to a deficit
of approximately 8% of GDP in 1998. The nominal
interest rates needed to finance this deficit38  were kept
at very high levels,39  often exceeding 3% per month,
while monthly inflation rates were around 0.3% (and
were even negative in some months in 1997 and 1998).
5. Financial restructuring
The elimination of transfers to the banking sector
(generated by inflation)40  after price stabilization
32 In 1979 the government set up a special ministry for the control
of State enterprises, charged with limiting the number of enter-
prises belonging to the State. It was only in 1981 that the first
special commission on privatization was set up (Pinheiro and
Giambiagi (1998)).
33 For a detailed account of the whole process of privatization in
Brazil, see Pinheiro (1996).
34 With a significant number of enterprises still for sale in the en-
ergy and telecommunications sectors.
35 For example, in the case of the states privatization was impor-
tant because of its stronger fiscal impact: whereas the enterprises
belonging to the central government obtained a fiscal surplus equal
to 0.1% of GDP on average during the 1995-1998 period, those be-
longing to the states had a deficit of 0.5% of GDP over the same
period. See Pinheiro and Giambiagi, 1998.
36 The “Olivera-Tanzi effect” associated with the end of inflation-
ary processes was only small: in the years with high rates of infla-
TABLE 1
Brazil: Privatization programme, 1991-2000
(Millions of dollars)
Sector Number of Assets Debt Total
enterprises sold transferred
Iron and steel 8 5 562 2 625 8 187
Petrochemicals 27 2 698 1 003 3 701
Electricity 3 3 907 1 670 5 577
Railways 6 1 697 — 1 697
Mining 2 3 305 3 559 6 864
Telecommunications 21 26 978 2 125 29 103
Others 14 2 583 344 2 927
Federal enterprises 81 46 730 11 326 58 056
Enterprises
belonging to the states 26 26 866 6 750 33 616
Total 107 73 596a 18 076 91 672a
Source:  Pinheiro and Giambiagi (1998) and Banco Nacional de
Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social (n/d).
a
  Including sales of minority holdings.
tion this effect was in reality positive, since the indexed income
associated with arrears of payment generated fresh gains for the
government.
37 It is calculated that the public sector wage policy applied in 1995
(whereby wage adjustments were on the basis of past inflation)
increased the wage bill by 15% to 20%. Furthermore, the significant
increase in the minimum wage in that year also affected social
security expenditure.
38 And to neutralize the monetary impact on the flow of external
resources.
39 And rose even higher in response to the external shocks in 1995,
1997 and 1998.
40 These transfers were generated by the decline in the real value
of deposits. It is calculated that they amounted to 4% of GDP in
1990-1993, but disappeared as from 1995.
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caused the monetary authorities to create new
mechanisms for avoiding systematic crises in the
financial sector. The rapid drop in inflation rates gave
rise to a bigger demand for money, so that in 1998 the
broadest monetary concept (M4) was double that of
1994 in real terms, while credit to the private sector
increased fourfold in those four years.
However, this expansion of credit includes both
normal finance and a significant number of resources
used to restructure the banking sector. The elimination
of the gains generated by inflation, together with the
big rise in interest rates (see figure 3) as from March
1995,41  gave rise to enormous difficulties for a number
of private and public banks, so that restructuring of the
banking sector was a very necessary measure.42
The monetary authorities were obliged to intervene
a number of institutions and had to create various
instruments for dealing with the problems encountered.
The most important of the mechanisms used were credit
programmes to finance institutions in difficulties, at
both the federal and state levels, together with the
redesign of the sector as a whole through mergers or
the sale of private and public banks with liquidity
problems.43  This led to the elimination of most of the
institutions owned by the state governments. As a result
of this process, the banking system managed to cope
with the 1997-1998 external shocks with a total loan/
assets coefficient of 35% and a capital/reserves ratio of
13%.44
6. Financing social expenditure
The macroeconomic adjustment also had effects in the
area of social expenditure. In the early 1990s, social
policies were usually financed through monetary trans-
fers. The enormous number of potential clients was at
variance, however, with a system which depended to a
large extent on contributions45  and had a large number
of administrative bodies and service networks, together
with strong concentration of resources (two-thirds) in
the federal government, which led to faulty targeting
of social programmes. Furthermore, the considerable
number of social funds and the fact that they were linked
to specific expenditure items meant that resources for
social expenditure were highly sensitive to the eco-
nomic cycle (Draibe, 2000).
The 1988 Constitution reduced the links between
contributions and the financing of the system,46  made
access to social services a universal right, and
established minimum levels of social benefits. The most
radical change was in the area of health, with the
creation of the single health system, covering both
health and social security services.
The paradoxical feature of all this is that in the
early 1990s there was feverish legislative activity to
regulate the new constitutional provisions, yet at the
same time there was a drastic reduction in social
expenditure47  and in the institutional facilities for
providing social services. In the middle of the decade a
new social development strategy was adopted which
took into account the universal right of access to basic
social services and included employment and income
programmes to generate new opportunities, with
priority for universal programmes.48
Since 1994, in spite of the fiscal difficulties facing
the states and municipalities, both have been taking on
41 Average nominal monthly rates for inter-bank transactions rose
from 3.2% in February to 4.4% in March 1995.
42 The proportion of operations where recovery of the funds was
doubtful rose from less than 9% of the total number of loans to
nearly 14% by the end of 1995 (Baumann and Mussi, 1999).
43 Between July 1994 and December 1997, 42 banks out of a total
of 271 were affected by such problems.
44 That is to say, higher than the 8% ratio recommended by the
Basle Committee.
45 Fixed percentages of wages and profits, together with other semi-
fiscal sources of income.
46 Although financing continued to be heavily dependent (58% in
1996) on such contributions.
47 Government social expenditure went down from 11.4% of GDP
in 1990 to 9.7% in 1992 (a period of recession). Each of the areas
was affected differently: whereas federal expenditure in 1993 on
health, nutrition and drinking water supply and sanitation was only
50-60% of its 1989 level, expenditure on social security doubled
over the same period (Draibe, 2000).
48 Social expenditure as a proportion of GDP increased by approxi-
mately 4% between 1990-1991 and 1996-1997, reaching almost
20%. In the same period, the share of social expenditure in total
public expenditure remained practically unchanged (59%) (ECLAC,
1999).
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more and more responsibility for the financing of social
programmes, thus reducing the amount of resources
provided by the central government.49
According to Draibe (2000), in 1995 the federal
government was still responsible for the major part of
expenditure, in 8 out of a total of 14 social programmes.
In 1995, the joint social expenditure of the federal, state
and municipal governments was equivalent to 21% of
GDP, and 85% of that amount was devoted to education,
health, social assistance and benefits of public officials.
Price stabilization and political will were the factors
which made possible better targeting and greater
selectivity of programmes, new expenditure procedures,
and more clearly defined technical criteria for the
allocation of resources. Social programmes concentrate
on two lines of action: investment in human resources
and social assistance, and programmes for combating
poverty.
7. Reform of the pension system
The need to reform the social security sector became
evident in the late 1980s, due to a number of factors:
up to then, the system had been incorporating members
faster than the rate of increase of the number of
beneficiaries, and even at a faster rate than the growth
of the labour force, but there was a significant change
in the demographic pattern of the population, and the
1988 Constitution brought rural workers into the
system.50  The number of new pensioners between 1991
and 1995 was almost two million, while the average
pension almost doubled in value over that period and a
third of the rural population of pensionable age received
pensions (Dias and Amaral, 2000).
Furthermore, there is the fact that the life
expectancy of the population has been increasing in
recent decades. As the system allowed members to retire
on the basis of their number of years of service, in 1995
two-thirds of the new pensioners were only 54 years
old, with a remaining life expectancy of over 22 years.
In 1998, social security expenditure absorbed almost
10% of GDP,51  and there were almost 19 million real
beneficiaries. In that year, the social security deficit
amounted to some 3% of GDP, due mainly (75%) to the
benefits paid to public employees.
The reform of the social security system therefore
involved the establishment of a maximum value for
pensions as well as a minimum age for retirement.
Moreover, military personnel were obliged to begin to
pay contributions.
8. Investment and productivity
As was to be expected, price stabilization and trade
openness promoted economic activity and investment,
both through increased domestic demand for consumer
goods and through easier access to cheaper capital
goods.52
In the early 1990s (especially between 1990 and
1992), most manufacturing enterprises went through a
process of rationalization of their production, as one of
the ways of facing up to the competition from imported
products. With the disappearance of inflation, the returns
on investment became relatively high, because of the
lower cost of equipment and parts, the fact that most
enterprises had already gone through a rationalization
process, and progress made in overcoming the
technological backwardness of the sector thanks to the
new equipment installed. All this helped to increase factor
productivity in industry, although it also made the sector
more capital-intensive.53
Investment in the industrial sector was concentrated
mainly on modernization, with only a limited increase
in production capacity in some specific sectors.54
Classifying sectors by capital formation reveals a
different picture from that observed in previous
investment cycles, such as the 1970s. Table 2 shows
the basic information in this respect.
49 This has been possible thanks to the bigger transfers of resources
from the federal government to the states and municipalities and
the improvement in the latter’s fiscal income: in 1980 the states
received 25% and the municipalities 9.6% of total income, but in
1991 the corresponding shares were 27% and 16% (Draibe, 2000).
50 The amount of the retirement pension is calculated on the basis
of the last 36 months of contributions to the system, up to a
maximum of approximately US$ 1,000. Public employees, however,
can retire with a pension equivalent to their last salary. Rural
workers are guaranteed retirement pensions, but do not make
contributions. It is considered that the transfer of resources resulting
from the inclusion of rural workers in the social security system
has helped considerably in reducing the percentage of families under
the poverty line from 41% in 1990 to 20% in 1996, according to
ECLAC estimates (ECLAC, 1999).
51 Taking account of both public and private pension schemes.
52 This effect was further amplified by the overvaluation of the
exchange rate during most of the second half of the decade.
53 According to estimates by Bonelli and Fonseca (1998b), the
annual increase in total factor productivity rose from an average of
1% in the 1980s to 2.1% in the 1990-1997 period. According to
Neri and Camargo (1999), industrial production increased by 10%
between 1991 and 1995, while employment in the industrial sector
went down by 22% over the same period, resulting in a 40% increase
in labour productivity.
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The sectors which had led the way in investment
in the 1970s –industry, mining and petroleum– had a
smaller share of gross capital formation in the 1990s.
Investment in infrastructure (electric power,
telecommunications, transport and drinking water
supply and sanitation) went down in the 1990-1994
period to between a half and a third of the values
registered in the 1970s. If the first and second halves
of the 1990s are compared, it will be noted that there
was a decline in absolute terms in investment in electric
power, a more or less stable pattern in the transport
and drinking water supply and sanitation sectors, and a
marked increase in telecommunications.
In the industrial sector, consumer goods registered
the fastest increase (the most dynamic segments were
those of consumer durables, led by the transnational
corporations), thanks to the marked “wealth effect”
resulting from price stabilization.55  In the case of
intermediate and capital goods, the results were
unfavourable.
The three new elements affecting investments in
the second half of the 1990s were the incentives offered
by states and municipalities,56  the environment which
existed after privatization, and the imported component
in investment and production processes. Another
important feature of investment from the mid-1990s
on is the fact that much of it is associated with the
exploitation of the country’s comparative (static)
advantages in natural resources.57
This raises the question of how far the industrial
growth model in recent years has been based on the
resource endowment, and hence how far it depends on
the international commodity market.58  A specialization
pattern centered on production segments with sluggish
demand raises doubts about its long-term sustainability
and its vulnerability to fluctuations in outside markets.
An important aspect is therefore the real capability of
the economy to support an alternative model favouring
more technology-intensive products.
9. Production development policies
Up to the late 1980s, Brazil’s science and technology
policy was concentrated on the construction of
infrastructure for research and development, along two
TABLE 2
Brazil: Gross fixed capital formation, 1970-1997
(As a percentage of GDP, at constant 1980 prices)
1970-1980 1981-1989 1990-1994 1995-1997
Manufacturing 4.5 3.2 2.0 3.3
Mining 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1
Petroleum 0.9 1.0 0.4 0.4
Infrastructure 5.4 3.7 2.3 2.2
Electricity 2.1 1.6 0.9 0.6
Telecommunications 0.8 0.4 0.5 0.7
Transport 2.1 1.5 0.8 0.8
Drinking water supply
and sanitation 0.5 0.2 0.2 0.1
Others 12.5 9.7 10.1 11.1
Total gross fixed
capital formation 23.5 17.8 14.9 17.1
Source:  Bielschowsky (coord.), 1998.
54 In some sectors, such as the motor industry, there was indeed
more completely new investment, encouraged by the fiscal incen-
tives provided. In most sectors, however, investment projects were
aimed above all at modernization.
55 The only exception was that of textiles.
56 These were of decisive importance in the unprecedented geo-
graphical relocation of factories within the country in recent years.
57 According to Bielschowsky (coord., 1998), total fixed investment
in the manufacturing sector, at constant 1980 prices, averaged 3.3%
of GDP between 1995 and 1997. The group of “dynamic” sectors,
made up of manufacturers of steel products, transport equipment,
processed foodstuffs, electrical and electronic equipment,
pharmaceutical products, plastics and textiles, invested an average
of approximately 2.1% of GDP, while the manufacturers of chemical
products, machinery, non-metallic products, pulp and paper, and
rubber products invested only 0.77% of GDP during the same period.
58 In contrast, for example, with the strategies adopted by other
emerging economies and indeed by Brazil itself in previous de-
cades, such as incentives for (producers and) exporters to enter
new and more dynamic markets.
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main lines: a) provision of resources to finance research
and development projects by enterprises (these were
very seriously affected by the 1980s crisis), and b)
provision of fiscal incentives.
During the 1990s, the institutional structure
connected with innovation and research underwent
various changes, due above all to the reduction of the
role of the federal government:59  in 1990, it had been
responsible for 73% of investment in research and
development of new products (R&D), but by 1997 its
share had gone down to 64%.
Part of this reduction was offset by a more active role
on the part of the private sector. Thus, the share of
enterprises in research and development spending went
up from 15% to 20% between 1990 and 1997,
corresponding to an average of 0.7% of total sales.
Furthermore, the considerable number of ISO 9000
certificates granted to Brazilian firms60  and the increase
in private expenditure on technology and capital goods
reflect the concern to modernize factories.61  However,
local enterprises as a whole have not developed their own
capacity for innovation in order to penetrate new markets.
Analysis of the potential supply of research and
development is of fundamental importance for any
country, and even more so for an economy where two-
thirds of exports consist of industrial goods. In the
recent experience of Brazil, however, there are three
effects which appear to have contributed to the low
percentage of R & D expenditure as a proportion of
total sales: the negative impact of the fiscal adjustment,
which meant fewer public resources for the financing
of activities in this field; reforms in legislation which
facilitated the importation of technology62  (as part of
the opening-up of the economy); and the composition
of exports,63  which displays a growing share of
products making intensive use of natural resources.
In general, the sluggish performance of Brazilian
exports during the 1990s would appear to be connected
with the specialization pattern: in spite of the greater
share of industrial products, the export account is
mainly characterized by the export of commodities
making intensive use of natural resources and products
making intensive use of energy or labour.64
An economic environment more open to trade also
had implications for the multiplier effects of foreign
trade. For example, Tigre, Cassiolato and others (2000)
note that for sectors such as ceramics and steel -in whose
production Brazil has a comparative (static) advantage-
trade openness did not represent a challenge for local
producers,65  and in fact was crucial for the development
of a network of local suppliers. In the case of other
sectors –such as motor vehicles and
telecommunications– which depend less on the
availability of resources, exposure to competitive
imported products, linked with easier access to capital
goods and inputs produced abroad, meant a new
challenge which in fact led to them breaking their links
with local suppliers, thus affecting the possibility of
encouraging research in the development of products
or processes.
10. Employment
These factors –price stabilization, strong domestic
demand and investment in specific sectors– had
different consequences for the labour market. Up to
the beginning of 1995, total employment grew as the
net result of the growth in the number of workers in
commerce and the services sector and in the informal
sector, which more than made up for the decline in the
level of employment in industry and agriculture.
The share of industrial employment in total
employment went down from 25% to 16% between
1990 and 1997.66  Practically the whole of this change
in the sectoral structure of employment is due to the
59 Total expenditure on science and technology amounts to
approximately 1.5% of GDP (Tigre, Cassiolato and others, 1999).
60 Some 2,500 certificates up to 1997 (Tigre, Cassiolato and others,
1999).
61 Although positive, these results are poor compared with other
countries. R & D as a proportion of sales comes to almost 2% in
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) countries, and even other emerging countries show a greater
commitment to technology: in South Korea the share of the private
sector in research and development amounts to 80%.
62 In 1991, and again in 1993, specific regulations were adopted
which facilitated technology transfer contracts between the head
offices of foreign firms and their subsidiaries in Brazil (see Tigre,
Cassiolato and others (2000) for a description of the main changes
made in the legislation).
63 The elimination of some export incentives has led to a more
“passive ” share in the international division of labour.
64 Wood pulp, paper, orange juice, soybean products, semi-
processed mineral products, etc.
65 In fact, the ceramics sector represents a success-story in terms of
restructuring, which resulted in an increase in the number of patents
taken out, greater investment in R & D, and various other positive
effects.
66 There was also a decline in employment in agriculture, which
will be analysed later.
C E P A L  R E V I E W  7 3  •  A P R I L  2 0 0 1160
BRAZIL  IN  THE  1990s: AN ECONOMY IN TRANSIT ION  •  RENATO BAUMANN
migration of workers from the manufacturing sector to
commerce and the services sector,67  largely because
of the new technologies and the (low) cost of labour.68
Table 3 shows the urban occupational structure, by
sectors.
It can be seen from table 3 that the reduction in
employment in the manufacturing sector was offset by
an increase in the absorption of labour in the housing,
commerce and services sectors.69
Employment in the industrial sector has been
declining since 1995 in spite of the increase in
production,70  whereas employment in commerce and
the services sector grew up to late 1996 but
subsequently stagnated. In other words, at the beginning
of the price stabilization process the increase in the
number of workers in the services sector more than
made up for the decline in the number of workers in
industry, but this phenomenon only lasted up to 1997.
As a result, at the end of the decade there was increased
and growing open unemployment: according to the
Brazilian Geographical and Statistical Institute (IBGE),
open unemployment rose from 4.3% in 1990 to 7.6%
in 1998 (see figure 4).
In general, there was a clear productivity shock in
both the industrial and services sectors of the Brazilian
economy, but it was more severe in the case of the
former.71  The references already made earlier to the
increases in productivity reflected in the labour/output
ratios are confirmed by other indicators, such as the
evolution of the initial wage of newly-hired workers72
and the number of years of formal schooling of
industrial workers.73
The real income of urban workers did not go down
during the whole period, because: a) the stabilization
and trade openness processes tended rather to favour
the prices of non-tradeable goods; b) as long as these
favourable factors lasted, the real incomes of workers
in the services sector increased; c) when: i) employment
in the industrial and services sectors began to flag; ii)
open unemployment began to increase, and iii) relative
prices ceased to favour the products of those sectors,
so that the real income of workers in the services sector
began to go down steadily. In the industrial sector,
however, while employment went down the real income
of the workers continued to increase up to 1998, thus
raising the real cost of labour in that sector (see
figure 5).74
67 This migration was also facilitated by another structural
characteristic of the Brazilian labour market: an average of between
2.5% and 3% of all workers in industry change their jobs every
month, while approximately 40% of the workers in industry only
occupy the same job for less than two months, because of the
legislation governing severance payments (see Amadeo and
Gonzaga, 1997, and Amadeo and Neri, 1997, for more details).
68 The increase in the cost of labour in the industrial sector between
1994 and 1997 (55%) was greater than in the case of the services
sector (15%) (Camargo, 1998).
69 The figures on the agricultural sector in table 3 appear to reflect
a significant increase in the number of own-account workers: the
share of rural wage-earners went down from 44% of the total number
of persons employed in the sector in 1990 to 34% in 1996, while
the proportion of own-account workers increased from 53% to 64%
over the same period (ECLAC, 1999).
70 There has been an incipient recovery, however, since late 1999.
71 In the future this could lead to growing wage disparities between
these two sectors (Camargo, Neri and Reis, 2000).
72 Considered as an indicator of the marginal productivity of the
labour force, this suggests that between 1995 and 1997 the increases
in productivity were 45% in the industrial sector and 33% in the
services sector (Camargo, Neri and Reis, 2000).
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Agriculture and mining 6.8 8.7
Manufacturing 25.2 16.0
Housing 1.0 7.5
Transport and communications 4.8 4.6











Source: Brazilian Geographical and Statistical Institute (IBGE).
73 The percentage of workers with less than four years’ schooling
went down from 38% in 1989 to 31% in 1996, while the percentage
of workers with more than eight years’ schooling rose from 42% to
49% of the labour force (Camargo, Neri and Reis, 2000).
74 There was an increase of 30% between 1994 and 1997 (Camargo,
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The adjustment of the labour market to an open
economic environment with stable prices thus involved
the transfer of workers from the tradeable goods sector
to the non-tradeable sector. This is consistent with the
foregoing considerations on the growing capital-
intensity of the production process following trade
openness.
11. The agricultural sector
In the previous sections we have been dealing with the
urban sectors. Up to the mid-1980s, the agricultural
sector went through a period of constant government
intervention which was of fundamental importance for
the growth process, since it made possible the supply
of food at low prices. Since that time, however,
agriculture has lost its main compensation mechanism
-official programmes providing heavily subsidized
credit- as part of the fiscal adjustment process.
In the new (post-1990) environment, in which the
agricultural sector is exposed to international
competition and the loss of official credit, the main
factor behind the growth of production was the strong
systematic increase in productivity: the loss of easy
credit made producers try to reduce their average costs
through increases in productivity based on a moderate
reduction in the area cultivated and a marked cut in the
number of employees.
In the case of the main products, productivity in
the 1996-1998 period was substantially higher than in
1990-1992.75  All the productivity indicators for the
agricultural sector registered systematic increases
between 1987 and 1998, the annual rise in these
indicators being close to 1.8%.76
This recovery in productivity was favoured by: a)
the poor transport infrastructure, which led to more
intensive use of the land, especially in areas close to
urban centres; the growing use of new technologies
developed in the country;77  c) the growing
professionalism of the labour force, due among other
factors to migration from the southern states to the
western and northern regions of the country, and d) trade
openness, which reduced the cost of inputs (Dias and
Amaral, 2000).
One of the most important elements in the sustained
growth of agricultural production was the improvement
of the terms of trade of the sector. Between 1987 and
1994 (the peak year), the terms of trade of agriculture
increased by 46%, while the profitability of the sector
increased by 59% between 1987 and 1998, reflecting a
rise of 22% in productivity and 31% in the terms of
trade of the agricultural sector (Dias and Amaral, 2000).
This advantage in respect of productivity and the terms
of trade enabled producers using new technologies to
find substitutes for traditional rural credit.
The general picture emerging from these figures
is that the agricultural sector managed to adjust through
higher productivity, together with an increase in the
capital/product ratio and greater selectivity of
producers. Together, these factors placed a still greater
burden on the urban labour market.
12. Reforms still pending
The above indicators suggest that Brazil is on the way
to completing the set of so-called “first generation”
reforms. The further continuation of this process will
involve the adoption of more measures, such as the
reform of social security policies. Experience has
already shown that in its present form this system is
bound to register considerable deficits in the years to
come. If the system is to keep in balance over time, it
will be necessary to take various additional measures.
It has already been shown that the labour market is
subject to a number of restrictions imposed by the
legislation which, in some aspects, goes back to the 1930s.
Trade union representation, its financing and the incentives
to move between different activities are all part of the same
group of issues which must be tackled in the short term.
Other reforms that will be needed have to do with
the functioning of the system of justice, which is slow
and costly, and the system of political representation75 The increases in productivity were 26% in the case of cotton,
29% in soya beans, 27% in coffee, 30% in millet, and 21% in beans
(Dias and Amaral, 2000).
76 The growth rate in the stock-raising subsector was similar: close
to 1.9% per year (Dias and Amaral, 2000).
77 Mainly developed by the Brazilian Agricultural Research
Corporation (EMBRAPA) of the Ministry of Agriculture.
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and decision-making itself, through the creation (for
which there are no precedents in past history) of
mechanisms that will allow citizens to feel that they
are truly represented and actively participating. For this
purpose, profound changes need to be made in the
political and party structure and in electoral legislation.
IV
What is it that didn’t work?
Do we really know why?
Brazil has quite a lot of experience in making reforms.
Retrospectively, these reforms followed a well-defined
sequence, were varied, and mostly coincided with a
stabilization programme. Various indicators show that
not all of them achieved the expected results, however.
Firstly, the two episodes of intensification of the
import tariff reduction process, in 1990 and 1994, were
basically part of price stabilization programmes. The
lowering of tariffs was therefore neither an
instantaneous process nor one that followed a linear
course over time. On the contrary, various sectors had
to face a series of increases and reductions in tariff rates
over relatively short periods of time.78  These
ambiguous signals placed an extra burden on investors
and consumers of imported goods.
One of the most frequent criticisms of the
stabilization policy adopted in 1994 is that, when
analysed five years after its application, it is noted that
it continued to be basically just a stabilization
programme. There was a lack of a medium- and long-
term strategy, and economic policy continued to be
subordinated to that main objective, which naturally
had its costs.
The exchange rate was kept below the equilibrium
levels on the grounds that: i) the economic
“fundamentals” had been changed through price
stabilization (so that the parity criterion must be
reconsidered, on new bases; ii) exchange rate
devaluation would have caused pressures on costs (thus
adversely affecting the stabilization process), and iii)
the more stable macroeconomic environment would
ensure that the economy was attractive to foreign
investors. As may be seen from figure 6, there was a
decline in competitiveness (measured in parity terms
on the basis of the wholesale price index) up to mid-
1996.
The overvaluation of the exchange rate was
reduced when the government began to emphasize the
need to modify the exchange rate in the light of
domestic inflation (from 1997 on), but external
pressures made necessary a bigger change in 1999.
It was expected that the positive effects of the trade
reforms on competitiveness would stimulate exports.
It is not yet clear to what extent the easier access to
imported goods stimulated export growth, but at all
events the high domestic interest rates affected the
production of export goods, while the wage increases
associated with the overvaluation of the exchange rate
had a negative impact on the foreign trade agents. At
the same time, there was an explosive increase in the
demand for imports, and this gave rise to big trade
deficits.
The literature consulted for section II would seem
to suggest that this procedure may have been part of
the government’s strategy designed to win credibility
78 Baumann, Rivero and Zavattiero (1997) showed that in the case
of various products there were as many as eight changes in nominal
tariff rates within a period of 26 months: from July 1994 to
September 1996. In some cases, the nominal tariff rates fluctuated
between 0% and 19% (and between 19% and 73% in some other
products), and these changes took place repeatedly in both
directions, i.e., there was a series of rises and falls.
FIGURE 6
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for its reform programme, but it is not clear how much
time was required by the credibility argument: basically,
exchange policy was kept substantially unchanged for
four and a half years.
In the monetary field, the domestic debt was
financed during the first half of the 1990s through fixed-
interest bonds. As from the adoption of the Plano Real,
however, the price stabilization associated with the
inflow of external capital caused the authorities to
modify their finance structure, above all in favour of
flexible interest rate bonds (70%) and dollar-indexed
bonds (21%). The continuity of monetary policy and
the restrictions on the exchange rate were of
fundamental importance for maintaining price stability,
although the maintenance of high interest rates called
for by this combination of policies helped to increase
public indebtedness, without the government being able
to make the necessary policy changes.
This does not mean that efforts were not made to
increase revenue collection: fiscal income increased
from 25% of GDP in 1993 to 30% in 1998, and the
“primary” fiscal results79  were positive throughout the
second half of the decade. The problem lay in the area
of expenditure,80  especially as a result of the variation
in domestic interest rates: in 1998 interest payments
on the domestic public debt were equivalent to 44% of
total fiscal income.
The overvalued exchange rate stimulated the
demand for foreign exchange by importers. The
changes in legislation, price stabilization and renewed
access to international capital markets generated
substantial inflows of foreign capital, first in the form
of loans and portfolio investments and subsequently as
foreign direct investment.
The result was a vicious circle of inflows of foreign
currency which were monetized and had to be
neutralized through higher interest rates. The latter, in
turn, placed pressure on the fiscal accounts, giving rise
to the expansion of indebtedness, the need for new
loans, and hence also for still higher interest rates. Table
4 shows the various components of the fiscal deficit.
There are two aspects which are worthy of note in
table 4. First, interest payments on the domestic and
external debts explain most of the deficit in the late
1990s. Second, the monetization at the beginning of
the stabilization process was replaced by the sale of
domestic and foreign bonds as a source of public
finance.
The dependence on external saving proved to be a
two-edged weapon. It helped to finance the public debt,
but on the other hand the increase in the rate of external
saving after 1994 (from 0.9% to 4.4% of GDP in 1998
(see figure 7)) mainly went to finance consumption.
The investment rate rose from 15% to 18%81  over these
four years,82  although these investments were above
all in modernization projects and not in the expansion
of production capacity.83  Between 1993 and 1996,
private consumption accounted for 72% of the increase
79 I.e., excluding monetary correction and interest payments.
80 At the end of the decade another debate arose about the type of
revenue collected, which was based more and more on levies (fixed
percentages of wages and profits) than on taxes.
TABLE 4
Brazil: Main components of the fiscal deficit
(As percentages of GDP)
1994 1998
“Operational” fiscal deficit -1.4 7.5
Uses
“Primary” deficit -5.3 -0.0
Interest on domestic debt 3.2 7.2
Interest on external debt 0.7 0.3
Sources
Domestic finance -2.6 4.5
External finance -3.0 2.2
Monetary expansion 4.3 0.8
Source:  Central Bank of Brazil, 1999.
81 At constant 1980 prices.
82 Mainly by the private sector, for public investment on machinery
and equipment went down from 0.7% in 1994 to only 0.4% in
1998, while the corresponding rates for investment in construction
were 2.9% and 1.8%, according to the IBGE.
83 The dependence on external finance also raised the total external
debt by 47% over the same period: from US$ 151 billion in 1994
to US$ 222 billion in 1998.
FIGURE 7
Brazil: Investment and saving, 1981-1997













Investment/GDP Domestic saving/GDP External saving/GDP
Source:  Brazilian Geographical and Statistical Institute (IBGE).
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in aggregate demand, whereas capital formation only
accounted for 22% (Saínz and Calcagno, 1999).
The privatization programme helped to cope with
this situation of incomplete fiscal adjustment through
the sale of public enterprises and the reduction of the
fiscal burden caused by inefficient State enterprises.
Whatever the consequences for production efficiency
may have been, there are two collateral effects which
are worthy of note.
Some enterprises were sold even before the
regulation of the corresponding sector was completed,
and this may have affected competition on the domestic
market. Furthermore, the privatization of a number of
important enterprises was initially the result of financial
arbitrage operations, with the participation of agents
not directly involved in production activities and –until
recently– with only limited participation by foreign
investors. Consequently, the efficiency gains may not
have been as significant as had originally been planned,
or else more time was needed for the changes in
ownership to improve competitiveness.
Although one of the objectives of the privatization
programme appears to have been the maximization of
income, and in spite of the impressive amounts of
resources involved, the public debt continued to be
heavy, above all because of the public sector wage bill
(9% of GDP in 1997), the social security deficit (9.4%
of GDP) and the high real interest payments (3.4% of
GDP) (Cysne, 2000).
The privatization of public enterprises, together
with the changes in regulations and the elimination of
the public monopoly in various sectors, improved
private-capital activity, but this only occurred in the
production sector, since private-capital contributions to
social expenditure continued to be quite rare. Although
private enterprises and NGOs have long taken part in the
provision of public services, most of these services
continue to be basically a public-sector activity.
The level of social expenditure in Brazil is
comparable with that of most other middle-income
countries –approximately 19% of GDP, although unjustly
distributed– and the reforms have not so far been
successful in substantially changing the origin and
composition of the income which serves to finance it:
in spite of the changes made in the Constitution, social
expenditure continues to depend on funds from social
contributions (58% in 1996).84
Furthermore, the aggregate social indicators
suggest that there is still much to be done in this field.
Price stability and public transfers generated substantial
positive effects. The real income of employed persons
increased by 30% between 1993 and 1997, due mainly
to: a) a marked increase in transfers to families of all
income levels and b) changes in relative prices which
reduced the prices of staple products. Consequently,
between 1990 and 1996 the proportion of households
below the poverty line went down from 41% to 29%,85
which undoubtedly represents a positive development.
With regard to income equality, however, the
estimates of Neri and Camargo (2000), who use data
from the national household surveys (PNAD),86  confirm
the very marked concentration of income in Brazil,
since they reflect only a very slight change in the
indicators of inequality between 1990 and 1997.87  This
result is obtained regardless of whether the Theil index
(0.748 in 1990 and 0.715 in 1997, for all sources of
income) or the Gini coefficient (0.607 in 1990 and 0.595
in 1997, for all sources of income) are used.88
Neri and Camargo (2000) also show that detailed
calculations based on the primary data of the national
household surveys require some qualification of the
results. These slight declines in the general inequality
indicators do not reflect an improvement in income
distribution: the share of the richest strata of the
population in total income continues to be very high,
and the individuals in those income brackets made their
gains through a variety of effects, such as those
associated with the higher pay of more highly skilled
workers or particular types of activity, financial gains
obtained from higher interest rates, etc. Various tests
indicate that the apparent improvement suggested by
these indicators is due above all to the “wealth effect”
deriving from the reduction in the cost of the consumer
84 The resources continue to be concentrated in specific areas: the
federal government devotes two-thirds of its resources to social
security and payments to public employees; the states devote most
of their expenditure to education, payments to public employees
and health, while the municipalities devote three-quarters of their
expenditure to education, housing, health and drinking water supply
and sanitation.
85 The reductions were from 36% to 25% in urban areas and from
64% to 46% in rural areas (ECLAC, 1999).
86 Pesquisa Nacional de Domicílios (PNAD).
87
 Indeed, the coefficients are almost unchanged if the margin of
error of this type of indicators is taken into account.
88 Alternative methodologies using a different unit for analysis
–like that of ECLAC, 1999– also indicate a high degree of
concentration, with relatively little change during the 1990s: in
1990 the Gini coefficients were 0.528 for urban areas and 0.456
for rural areas, only a little lower than the 1997 coefficients of
0.538 and 0.460, respectively.
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shopping basket and the lower volatility of workers’
income after price stabilization. There was practically
no significant structural change in the income
distribution profile in this period.
At all events, the considerable number of
households which rose above the poverty line had a
considerable impact on domestic aggregate demand.
Consequently, imports shot up and aggregate investment
rates rose, largely to satisfy domestic demand.
In most industries there was a significant expansion
in investment in 1995-1997, as compared with 1990-
1994. Except in the telecommunications sector,
however, the level of this investment was lower than in
the 1970s and 1980s. In the 1990s there was clearly a
new investment model which was perhaps more
efficient from the microeconomic point of view, but
not from the standpoints of production capacity and
economic growth.89
Outside the industrial field, levels of investment
were varied. In the mining sector, investment was quite
scarce because of the relatively limited knowledge of
the available resources and the poor market prospects
for those minerals whose reserves were known; the
same was true in the petroleum sector.
Production and distribution bottlenecks are so
widespread that they have come to be known as the
“Brazilian cost”, to denote general inefficiency costs
due to specific cases of inadequacy. Investment in
infrastructure, too, is a mixture of successes and
failures: modernization of the ports has been under way
since their privatization, but there is relatively little
investment in railways and equipment, and there
continues to be a lack of integration of the railway
system with other means of transport.90
The most outstanding performance is that of the
telecommunications sector, where there is a significant
amount of investment connected with privatization. The
electric power sector has turned in only a mediocre
performance, however, and this is leading to an
insufficient supply of electricity and even to the risk of
power cuts.
Thus, from the point of view of industrial policy
the reforms were only partially successful in terms of
improving the infrastructure. As already shown, output
growth could recover for a time, but there are increasing
doubts about the resulting structure and the long-term
prospects with regard to the economy’s place in the
international division of labour.91
Generally speaking, enterprises have tried to adjust
to competition from imported goods through defensive
specialization strategies which have often adversely
affected local production of components and products
with the highest content of technology. The adjustment
process of the industrial sector has increased the
competitiveness of sectors producing on a large scale
with intensive use of labour. At the same time, the easier
importation of capital goods has stimulated the
modernization of technologically sluggish sectors.
In the period from 1991 to 1993, various measures
helped to facilitate the importation of technology, but
the use of foreign technology has not usually been
accompanied by a corresponding domestic
technological effort, other than the adaptation of those
technologies to local conditions.92  Only a few
enterprises maintain research and development
activities, and the external technological links of
Brazilian enterprises are quite limited, not only with
other enterprises but also with universities and
research institutes. The establishment of technical
relations among enterprises is made more difficult by
the fact that the industrial sector is excessively
heterogeneous.
The spread of production processes which are more
capital-intensive and involve more imported
components has also helped to increase a structural
component of open unemployment: even if the
economy begins to produce more once again, the
reduction in open unemployment will be slower than
on previous occasions. Thus, the average length of time
89 Furthermore, investment was stronger in those sectors which
maintained to some extent their protection against foreign compe-
tition, which had higher levels of productivity (consumer durables,
for example), and where there was a greater presence of
transnational corporations.
90 Private investment is beginning to improve conditions on vari-
ous highways, but only a limited number of Brazilian expressways
are candidates for privatization, in view of the private sector’s ex-
pectations as regards profitability.
91 There is also concern about the real participation of producers in
export activity: out of a total of over a million registered enter-
prises, only 14,000 systematically operate on the external market.
92 The balance of payments data show an increase in the importa-
tion of technology during the 1990s and a significant change in its
composition: the share of “specialized technical services” in total
imports went down from 67% in 1990 to 32% in 1996, while at the
same time there was a pronounced increase in payments for “use
of patents” and “supply of industrial technology” (in the case of
non-patented technologies). This reflects an increase in the impor-
tation and transfer of foreign technology, without a corresponding
increase in investment in research and development by local firms
(see Tigre, Cassiolato and others, 2000).
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a worker remains unemployed rose from 3.5 months in
1991 to 6 months in 1998 (Camargo, Neri and Reis,
2000). This situation is further aggravated by the labour
legislation.93  An average of 3% of the workers in the
industrial sector change jobs every month, which
reduces the incentives to provide training and heightens
the difficulties already mentioned regarding local
technological efforts.
The effects of the adjustment were also perceived
in rural areas. The reduction in credit, trade
liberalization and an overvalued exchange rate caused
significant changes in the relative prices of agricultural
products.
The agricultural sector adjusted by experimenting
with different forms of domestic capitalization, mostly
associated with a notable increase in productivity and
reductions in costs and assets. As a result, there was a
high level of unemployment.94
The increase in the demand for food which
occurred after the stabilization process95  was covered
by the domestic supply of food, which was stimulated
by the significant reduction in the cost of imported
inputs. This fact, together with the marked reduction
in official credit, discriminated against small producers,
who use more traditional technologies. The elimination
of producers with below-average levels of productivity
also helped to increase the rate of open unemployment.
The problems resulting from this situation and the
dissatisfaction with the results obtained are due to the
fact that the reforms were incomplete, wrongly
implemented, or sent wrong signals to the economic
agents.
V
Lessons from the Brazilian experience
The reforms applied in Brazil since the late 1980s are
quite enlightening in various aspects. First, they have
at least two features which have not been taken into
account in the literature on reforms: a) they were applied
in parallel with a regional integration process
(MERCOSUR) which involved significant commitments,
at least in terms of external trade policies, and b) Brazil
has a federal structure, and this has major implications
for the results of many reforms such as those in the
social security system and the financial sector.
As suggested in figure 1 (see section III above),
the sequence of the reforms seems to have corresponded
to the recommendations made in the literature: trade
reform preceded all the others. There were nevertheless
two clearly identifiable stages –up to mid-1994, and
after that time– with the turning-point being represented
by the adoption of an energetic price stabilization
programme.
In other words, the trade reform process began at
a time when the economy was still suffering from
serious macroeconomic imbalances –so that it was not
possible to maximize the benefits transmitted through
relative prices– and then speeded up in parallel with
the price stabilization programme.
Simultaneous trade openness and deflation is more
fully covered in the literature on reforms.
The indicators show that in reality the trade
openness process aided stabilization and increased the
surpluses of both producers and consumers, through
access to imported goods. The simultaneous presence
of exchange rate overvaluation, which was needed for
the purpose of stabilization, affected both the trade
balance and the relative prices of tradeable and non-
tradeable goods. As a result, there was a trade deficit,
and the movement of factors towards the production of
non-tradeable goods was stimulated.96
93 When the economy is growing and there is low unemployment,
there is an implicit incentive for workers to provoke their own
dismissal, as in this case they receive a month’s wages, plus 40%
of a fund (FGTS) built up by the enterprise they work in, at the rate
of one month’s wages per year of service in the enterprise (Amadeo
and Gonzaga, 1997).
94 It is calculated that the number of workers in the agricultural
sector went down by 23% (5.5 million jobs) between 1985 and
1996, but the sector’s output increased by 30% over the same period.
95 The purchasing power of urban workers has increased in relation
to the cost of food and clothing by over 60% since 1990, as the
increase in the wages of unskilled workers exceeded the increase
in food prices.
96 This was very similar to what an absorption-type balance of
payments model would have predicted: a shift of the production
frontier, in which relative prices favour the production of non-
tradeable goods.
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It is generally accepted that during stabilization
programmes the maintenance of an overvalued
exchange rate is a cost that has to be paid, if it forms
part of the government’s strategy designed to show its
firm commitment to the reform process. The social cost
of the alternative -losing credibility with regard to the
reforms- could turn out to be infinitely greater. The
question raised by the Brazilian experience, however,
is why this policy lasted so long: much longer than
would be considered necessary to generate credibility.
This therefore gave rise to growing concern about
long-term growth. The signals sent to the economic
agents were mainly aimed at promoting stabilization.
Not much was done in terms of creating suitable
conditions for the recovery of growth, except for the
increases in efficiency expected from privatization and
trade openness. Consequently, there was an increase in
investment as a whole, and it was more efficient in
microeconomic terms, but the amount invested has not
been large enough from the point of view of the long-
term growth strategy (there was only a limited increase
in production capacity), and it does not hold out much
hope as regards export performance.
It was also noted earlier that the literature on
reforms states that the financial sector should be
reformed before controls on foreign capital are
eliminated. Here, too, the Brazilian experience was
rather special. Incentives for foreign investment were
adopted in 1990-1991, but the real financial sector
reform only took place in 1995, after it was seen that
adjustments needed to be made because of the loss of
the profits previously derived from inflation, which had
been channeled to the banking sector. This reform did
not bring about a reduction in interest rates, as might
have been expected. Instead, there was a vicious circle
of capital flows linked with the fiscal deficit, this led to
even higher rates which in turn attracted fresh inflows
of capital, and this process was repeated successively.
According to the models analysed in section II,
whenever lack of confidence in the permanence of the
reforms is linked with access to external finance, the private
sector ends up contracting debts to finance the expected
consumption. The Brazilian experience is different,
however. This same effect -increasing external
indebtedness primarily in order to finance domestic
consumption- took place in a context of relatively low
levels of investment, but strong domestic demand, although
there were few doubts about the government’s intentions
(as the series of political victories won by it shows).
The basic recommendations regarding structural
adjustment likewise indicate that public expenditure
should be concentrated on health, education and
infrastructure, leaving all the other activities in the hands
of private enterprise.
This is probably the aspect in which the federal
structure of Brazilian society is most clearly seen as a
determinant of the results. Sections III and IV showed
that various characteristics altered the structure of
public finance. The evidence also shows that: a) private
sector commitment to the financing of these areas is
slow and limited, and b) there are structural restrictions
which condition the extent to which it is possible to
transfer federal government expenditure to the states
and municipalities. If it is desired to insist on these
reforms, this will call for a new design of the fiscal
structure.
This latter aspect, together with the signs of
rigidities in the labour market due to the legislation,
and the increasingly evident cost of the manner of
operation of the judiciary and legislature, mean that
there is no room for partial reforms. If the aim is to
maintain the reform process, then once that process has
been initiated it must be constantly deepened and
widened.
In short, there are at least seven lessons which can
be learned from the experience of Brazil in the 1990s.
1. There are clear advantages in ending inflation,
but the results obtained will depend on the way the
stabilization process is kept up.
Brazil did not adopt either i) a repressive scheme
like that adopted in Chile in the 1980s or that followed
in Argentina (with Bonex and reductions in nominal
wages) or ii) a negotiated process like those adopted in
Mexico and Israel. Instead, since the mid-1990s Brazil
has combined: a) a nominal exchange rate anchor; b)
high positive real interest rates; c) repression of real
wages in the public sector, and d) quantitative
adjustments in the labour market, with the result that
this set of measures has created obstacles to
competitiveness and medium- and long-term growth.
2. As economic theory predicts, trade openness
increased both producer and consumer surpluses, but
the way the openness process was carried out seems
to have imposed excessively high costs on some
sectors.
3. Fiscal adjustment is essential if it is desired to
avoid excessively high interest rates and resume action
in the public sector. Such adjustment must be planned,
however, so that it does not adversely affect production
efficiency or impose excessive social costs: private
financing of social expenditure is neither immediate
nor sure.
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4. Restructuring of the financial sector is of
fundamental importance in a world of intensive capital
movements: in this respect, the Brazilian process was
less costly in terms of GDP than similar processes in
other countries, and it seems to have been of crucial
importance for avoiding the multiplier effects of recent
external crises.
5. Although it is important, price stabilization
should not be made the sole objective of economic
policy. Experience has shown that it takes some time
for expectations of inflation to disappear.97  It is just as
important, however, to transmit the right signals to the
economic agents about the recovery of production in
order to ensure that suitable conditions for the reforms
are sustainable over time.
6. Once begun,  the reform process will
determine its own continuity, progressing in each
stage if there is a firm intention to avoid a relapse.
Consequently, economic contexts of low inflation
and open economic relations with the rest of the
world demand fiscal consistency and changes in
labour legislation, as well as in administrative and
institutional procedures.
7. Relying on external saving to resume an
investment cycle is a risky approach, since the decisions
of foreign investors are based not only on what happens
with regard to the internal variables but also on events
in other parts of the world.
The reforms made in Brazil in the 1990s were so
intensive and numerous that it may still be premature
to try to evaluate them in full. Various policy changes -
such as the privatization of public enterprises and
reform of the social security system- are only likely to
be reflected in dynamic advantages after a certain length
of time. However, ten years have passed since the first
significant changes, and there can be no doubt that some
lessons can already be derived from them which will
help us to understand adjustment processes in
developing countries.
The experience of Brazil is an example of a case
where the reforms did not follow the recommended
ideal sequence, and sometimes the wrong signals were
sent to the economic agents, but it is also a case where
the advantages already obtained could easily be lost if
the changes made so far came to be reversed.
(Original: Spanish)
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